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Abstract In many everyday activities, individuals have a
common interest in coordinating their actions. Orthodox
game theory cannot explain such intuitively obvious forms
of coordination as the selection of an outcome that is best
for all in a common-interest game. Theories of team rea-
soning provide a convincing solution by proposing that
people are sometimes motivated to maximize the collective
payoff of a group and that they adopt a distinctive mode of
reasoning from preferences to decisions. This also offers a
compelling explanation of cooperation in social dilemmas.
A review of team reasoning and related theories suggests
how team reasoning could be incorporated into psycholog-
ical theories of group identification and social value orien-
tation theory to provide a deeper understanding of these
phenomena.
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Near the end of the 1960 movie Spartacus, directed by
Stanley Kubrick, a Roman general addresses a group of
slaves who have been captured after rising up in revolt,
offering to spare them and return them to slavery if they
identify their leader, Spartacus. To save his comrades,
Spartacus (played by Kirk Douglas) rises to his feet and
declares: BI am Spartacus.^ Immediately and without any
discussion among themselves, the other slaves stand up
one by one, also claiming BI am Spartacus,^ thereby
preventing the Roman general from singling out their lead-
er or anyone else for special punishment. This is a dramatic
example of coordination, one of the most fundamental pro-
cesses of social interaction, manifested whenever two or
more individuals try to align their actions with one another
in order to achieve a common goal.
Coordination is an elementary form of cooperation, rel-
atively neglected by researchers, perhaps partly because it
is so familiar and commonplace, but it is beginning to
attract attention (e.g., Thomas, Scioli, Haque, & Pinker,
2014). Surprisingly, because it seems so simple and obvi-
ous, it turns out to be inexplicable by orthodox game
theory, a highly developed theory designed precisely to
explain interactive decision making. Coordination thus
appears to be a classic example of the type of phenome-
non referred to by Heider (1958), in which Bthe veil of
obviousness that makes so many insights of intuitive psy-
chology invisible to our scientific eye has to be pierced^
(p. 7). In this article, we show how theories of team rea-
soning solve this problem convincingly and also provide a
compelling explanation for cooperation in social di-
lemmas. We review the literature on team reasoning, in-
cluding theoretical issues and experimental evidence, and,
for the sake of balance and completeness, we discuss
more briefly the principal competing theories of coordi-
nation and related theories of social psychology. We show
how certain psychological theories could be strengthened
significantly by incorporating team reasoning. Before go-
ing into details about these issues, it is necessary first to
say something about game theory and why it fails to ex-
plain coordination.
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Game theory
Although game-theoretic analyses of particular problems can
be complicated and difficult to understand, the fundamental
ideas of game theory are simple and straightforward. Any
social interaction in which two or more decision makers
choose between alternative ways of acting is a game in the
technical sense, provided that the outcome depends on all their
choices and they have consistent preferences among the pos-
sible outcomes. Virtually every interesting and important in-
terpersonal, political, and economic interaction can therefore
be modeled by a game, at least in principle. The conceptual
apparatus of game theory, first expounded in detail by von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), formalizes the decision
makers (players), their ways of acting (strategies), and their
preferences (payoffs), and makes two important assumptions.
The first is a weak rationality assumption that players act in
their own best interests (as they see them) in all circumstances
that arise, given their preferences and their knowledge and
beliefs at the time of acting. The second common knowledge
assumption is that the specification of the game, including the
players’ strategy sets and preferences, and the rationality of the
players in the sense of the first assumption, are common
knowledge in the game; this means that all players know these
facts, all know that all know them, all know that all know that
all know them, and so on. Common knowledge was a tacit
assumption in game theory until it was explicitly introduced
and named by Lewis (1969, pp. 52–69). From these primitive
concepts and assumptions, the principal goal of the theory is
simply to work out the logical implications that follow, seek-
ing to determine how rational players will act in particular
games or classes of games and hence what the outcomes will
be.
Game theory spans disciplines across the behavioral and
social sciences. Furthermore, according to at least one
influential scientist, its extension into biology by Maynard
Smith and Price (1973) was Bone of the most important ad-
vances in evolutionary theory since Darwin^ (Dawkins, 1976,
p. 90). It is therefore remarkable that the theory fails complete-
ly in certain elementary cases, the most striking being strategic
coordination. In particular, noncooperative game theory—the
branch of the theory dealing with interactions in which the
players cannot negotiate enforceable agreements among them-
selves—seems powerless to explain payoff dominance, a fun-
damental form of coordination.
Payoff dominance
In their Nobel Prize winning work on equilibrium selection in
noncooperative games, Harsanyi and Selten (1988, pp. 80–90,
355–359) discussed payoff dominance at length, especially in
relation to Aumann’s (1987, p. 3) version of the Stag Hunt
game, shown on the left in Fig. 1. Player 1 chooses between
row C (cooperate) and row D (defect), Player 2 independently
chooses between columns C and D, and the outcome of the
game is one of the four cells where the chosen strategies
intersect, with the payoffs to Players 1 and 2 shown in that
order by convention. Aumann (1990) discussed this game
again in a later publication, mentioning its name (as he had
not done previously) but commenting in a footnote: BWe have
not succeeded in hunting this story down to its source^ (p.
206). In fact, the game is named after a hypothetical strategic
interaction suggested by the French philosopher Rousseau
(1755, Part 2, paragraph 9) during a discussion of the early
development of civil society. Rousseau imagined hunters who
need to coordinate their actions (to choose C) to catch a stag
(cerf), an endeavor that requires working together, but each is
tempted to defect from the joint enterprise (to choose D) and
go after a hare (lièvre), a smaller quarry that each could catch
without the other’s help. In Aumann’s version of the game, the
payoff for joint defection (7) is slightly less than the payoff for
unilateral defection (8)—we might imagine that a hunter is
slightly less likely to catch a hare if both hunters defect simul-
taneously, perhaps because both may chase after the same
hare—but that payoff is less than the payoff for joint cooper-
ation (9); and a unilateral C choice yields nothing (0).
On the right of Fig. 1 is a template commonly used to
define any symmetric 2 × 2 game. According to the template,
Aumann’s (1987, p. 3, 1990) Stag Hunt game is defined by the
inequalities R > T > P > S. The version originally introduced
into game theory and named by Lewis (1969, p. 7) had the
implied payoff structure R > T = P > S, but the strategic
properties of Aumann’s and Lewis’s versions are very simi-
lar.1 Like any other game, the Stag Hunt game models a po-
tentially unlimited range of social interactions (for a
completely different scenario involving a butcher and a
baker deciding whether to coordinate their actions and sell
hot dogs, see Thomas et al., 2014). Some authorities, includ-
ing Skyrms (2004), view the Stag Hunt game as the funda-
mental model of the evolution of social life.
In the Stag Hunt game (Fig. 1, left), the outcome (C, C) is a
Nash equilibrium by virtue of the fact that the C strategies are
best replies to each other. Neither player could get a better
payoff by choosing differently against a co-player’s choice
of C—against a C-chooser, a player receives 9 by choosing
C but only 8 by choosing D—and it follows that neither player
has a reason to regret choosing C if the co-player chooses it
too. According to an important indirect argument that can be
traced back to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, section
1 Aumann’s Stag Hunt game is sometimes confused with the Assurance game,
introduced by Sen (1969), in which R > P > T > S. Sen offered the following
interpretation involving two people who face the choice of going to a lecture or
staying at home: BBoth regard being at the lecture together the best alternative;
both, staying at home the next best; and the worst is for him or her to be at the .
. . lecture without the other^ (p. 4, footnote 5, italics in original).
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17.3.3, p. 148), in any game, a uniquely rational profile of
strategies (one for each player) must necessarily be a Nash
equilibrium. To see why this is so, note that the common
knowledge assumption implies that, in any uniquely rational
strategy profile, each player will be able to anticipate the co-
player’s strategy, because each player knows that the co-
player is rational and is therefore bound to choose the only
available rational strategy; but if that strategy profile were not
a Nash equilibrium, then at least one player would be choos-
ing a strategy that is not a best reply, violating the rationality
assumption; therefore, the strategy profile must be a Nash
equilibrium.
In Aumann’s Stag Hunt game (Fig. 1), a complication
arises from the fact that the outcome (D, D) is also a Nash
equilibrium—against a D-chooser, a player receives 7 by
choosing D but zero by choosing C. The asymmetric (C, D)
and (D, C) outcomes are not Nash equilibria. It is tempting to
think that rational players, who by definition seek tomaximize
their own payoffs, will coordinate by choosing C in this game
simply because the (C, C) equilibrium is better for both than
the (D, D) equilibrium—in game-theoretic terminology, be-
cause (C, C) is payoff dominant. In any game, an equilibrium,
e, weakly payoff dominates another equilibrium, f, if every
player receives at least as good a payoff in e as in f, and at
least one player receives a better payoff; strong payoff domi-
nance occurs when every player receives a strictly better pay-
off in e than in f. Economists and political scientists sometimes
call payoff dominance Pareto dominance. In Aumann’s Stag
Hunt game, remarkably, the fact that (C, C) is (strongly) pay-
off dominant does not provide the players with a reason, de-
rivable from the standard assumptions, to choose their C strat-
egies. The problem is that C is not an unconditionally best
choice: It is best only if the co-player chooses C. In fact,
against a D-chooser, the best reply is clearly D and not C. In
other words, it is rational for a player to choose C if and only if
there is a reason to expect the co-player to choose it, so the
crucial question is whether a player has any reason to expect a
co-player to choose C. The answer is clearly no, because the
game is perfectly symmetric, and the co-player faces exactly
the same dilemma.
The Hi-Lo game shown in Fig. 2 strips the payoff-
dominance phenomenon bare and exposes the problem more
starkly. Schelling (1960) introduced this game, calling it a
Bpure common-interest game^ (p. 291), and Bacharach named
it BHi-Lo^ in unpublished manuscripts and seminar
presentations in the mid-1990s; the name probably first ap-
peared in print in Bacharach and Stahl (2000). Using the tem-
plate in Fig. 1 (right), the Hi-Lo game is defined by the in-
equalities and equalities R > P > S = T = 0. It is essentially a
Stag Hunt game with the payoffs in the off-diagonal cells set
to zero; (H, H) and (L, L) are Nash equilibria, and (H, H) is
strongly payoff dominant over (L, L), as in the Stag Hunt
game. Any 2 × 2 game that has positive payoffs (R, R) and
(P, P) in the main diagonal and zero payoffs elsewhere is a Hi-
Lo game, provided that R > P > 0.
Regarding the zeros, it is worth commenting that payoffs in
game theory are assumed to be utilities, representing players’
preferences as determined or revealed by their own choices.
Utilities are measured on interval scales that are unique up to a
positive linear (affine) transformation and can differ between
players; hence, adding a constant to all the payoffs in a game,
or multiplying them all by a positive constant, leaves the stra-
tegic properties of a game intact. It follows that any set of
payoffs that can be transformed into the specified pattern by
positive linear transformations is also a Hi-Lo game.
In spite of its almost childlike simplicity, the Hi-Lo game
models innumerable strategic interactions in everyday life,
from two people deciding where to look for each other after
being separated in a shopping mall (one location more conve-
nient than another) to two car drivers deciding which side of a
narrow road to move to when an ambulance needs to pass in
an emergency (one side preferable in some way to the other).
Colman, Pulford, and Lawrence (2014) offered the following
illustrative scenario in which R = 2 and P = 1, as in Fig. 2:
Three children are trapped in a burning building, two of
them in one room and the third in a second room some
distance away. A neighbor breaks in and has just enough
time to rescue either the two children in the first room or
the single child in the second room, but the rescue can
succeed only if another neighbor with a fire extinguish-
er, who has found a different point of entry, heads
straight for the same room. If both go to the first room,
then the two children in it will be rescued, and if both go
to the second room, then the single child in that room
will be rescued; but if each neighbor goes to a different
room, then none of the children will be rescued. (p. 36)
Assuming that the neighbors prefer to save as many chil-
dren as possible, and that each neighbor is aware of the other’s




H 2, 2 0, 0
L 0, 0 1, 1




C 9, 9 0, 8
D 8, 0 7, 7
Player 2
C D
R, R S, T
T, S P, P
Fig. 1 Left: Aumann’s Stag Hunt game, with R > T > P > S. Right:
Generalized template for symmetric 2 × 2 games
entry, the strategic structure of this burning building scenario
matches the Hi-Lo game shown in Fig. 2, the first room cor-
responding to H and the second to L.
In Aumann’s Stag Hunt game, although the (C, C) equilib-
rium is payoff dominant, the (D, D) equilibrium is risk
dominant in a sense defined mathematically by Harsanyi and
Selten (1988, pp. 82–89), and risk dominance provides a pos-
itive reason for choosing D. Intuitively, it is obvious that D is
much safer: a C choice risks a possible payoff of zero, whereas
the worst possible payoff from a D choice is 7. In the Hi-Lo
game, there is no complication arising from risk dominance,
and H seems a Bno-brainer^ strategy choice. But careful anal-
ysis reveals once again that each player has a reason to choose
H if and only if there is a reason to expect the co-player to
choose it also, and there can be no such reason, because the
co-player has a reason to choose H if and only if there is a
reason to expect the first player to choose it. We are stuck in a
vicious circle that provides neither player with any reason,
based on the standard assumptions of game theory, to prefer
H to L.
In spite of this vicious circle, the Hi-Lo game induces a
powerful intuition in human decision makers that H is the
rational choice, and experimental evidence confirms that vir-
tually all players choose it (Bardsley, Mehta, Starmer, &
Sugden, 2010). What accounts for this phenomenon?
Classical game theory cannot explain it simply by pointing
to the fact that (H, H) is payoff dominant. Harsanyi and
Selten (1988), in order to achieve a Bgeneral theory of equi-
librium selection in games^ (pp. 357–359), therefore pro-
posed adding a payoff-dominance principle to the standard
rationality assumptions as an axiom. According to this princi-
ple, rational players choose payoff-dominant equilibria when-
ever they exist. Harsanyi and Selten acknowledged this to be
an unsatisfactory and temporary work-around that provides no
insight into the phenomenon it is designed to accommodate.
Harsanyi (1995) abandoned it soon after, having been con-
vinced by an argument put forward by Aumann (1990) that
payoff-dominant Nash equilibria are not self-enforcing. In the
Stag Hunt game, for example, Beven the possibility of preplay
communication will not enable the players to attain the
payoff-dominant equilibrium—as long as the game is a non-
cooperative game without enforceable agreements^
(Harsanyi, 1995, p. 94, footnote 3, italics in original).
Explaining coordination
Coordination has been a neglected aspect of interactive deci-
sion making, especially when viewed in relation to the vast
amount of research attention that has been devoted to cooper-
ation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and multiplayer social
dilemmas, in which unilateral defection yields a higher payoff
than joint cooperation (for reviews, see Balliet, Mulder, & Van
Lange, 2011; Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Ledyard, 1995).
Thomas et al. (2014) call coordination mutualistic
cooperation and cooperation of the social dilemma type altru-
istic cooperation. The problem of coordination is an interest-
ing and arguably more basic phenomenon than altruistic co-
operation: How do players coordinate on payoff-dominant
outcomes, not only in games with multiple Nash equilibria
but also more generally in common-interest games—games
in which a single outcome payoff dominates all other out-
comes, whether Nash equilibria or not? Leaving aside theories
that involve alterations of the specification of the game, such
as those that allow repetitions (e.g., Aumann & Sorin, 1989)
or costless Bcheap talk^ between players (e.g., Anderlini,
1999; Farrell, 1988; Rabin, 1994), there are a couple of falla-
cies that need to be mentioned briefly before we turn to team
reasoning.
Two common fallacies
The first is a fallacy that many people succumb to when they
initially encounter the payoff-dominance problem. It is a be-
lief that mere salience can explain coordination. A salient
outcome is one that stands out from the others or that appears
prominent or unique in some way, and it can serve as a focal
point for coordination. Many decades ago, Schelling (1960)
showed that people are remarkably adept at using salient focal
points to solve problems of coordination, and there is no doubt
that the (H, H) outcome in the Hi-Lo game, for example, is a
focal point by virtue of the fact that it conspicuously offers
higher payoffs than any other outcome. A focal point can
provide a purchase for team reasoning but cannot explain
coordination on its own. Gilbert (1989) presented a rigorous
argument establishing that salience is not enough to provide a
player with a reason for choosing a strategy. She showed that a
player has no reason at all to choose a strategy associated with
a salient focal point in the absence of an independent reason to
expect the co-player to choose it. Furthermore, any attempt to
derive, from the standard assumptions, a reason to expect a co-
player to choose it generates a version of the vicious circle
discussed above without leading to any conclusion, and this is
now generally acknowledged by game theorists (e.g.,
Anderlini, 1999; Aumann & Sorin, 1989; Bacharach, 2006,
Chapter 1; Bardsley et al., 2010; Janssen, 2001, 2006).
A second fallacy is the notion that if Player 1 (for example)
has no reason to expect Player 2 to choose H or L in the Hi-Lo
game, then Player 1 can use the principle of indifference (also
called the principle of insufficient reason) and simply assume
that Player 2 is equally likely to choose H or L. Under that
assumption, Player 1’s expected payoff from choosing H is
higher than from choosing L, because ½(2) + ½(0) = 1, where-
as ½(0) + ½(1) = ½; therefore Player 1 will choose the payoff-
maximizing strategy H. This argument is fallacious, because
the problem is not one of individual decision making, where
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standard decision theory using simple expected utility maxi-
mization applies: Player 2 is not indifferent Nature but an
intelligent player who can and will formulate and respond to
expectations about Player 1’s intentions. If the argument from
the principle of indifference were valid, then by the common
knowledge assumption, Player 2 would anticipate Player 1’s
choice of H and would choose a best reply to it, namely, H.
But this means that Player 2 would choose H with certainty,
and that contradicts the assumption on which Player 1’s argu-
ment for choosing H is based, namely that Player 2 is equally
likely to choose H or L. This proves by reductio ad absurdum
that the argument is invalid. The argument from the principle
of indifference and closely related fallacies based on probabil-
ities are discussed in greater depth by Colman, Pulford, and
Lawrence (2014).
Team reasoning
According to theories of team reasoning, players solve coor-
dination problems of the Hi-Lo or Stag Hunt type by adopting
a distinctive mode of strategic reasoning from preferences to
strategy choices. Standard game-theoretic reasoning amounts
to asking What do I want? and, given my knowledge of the
game and my expectations of what my co-player (s) will do,
What should I do to achieve this? Team reasoning alters the
unit of agency from the individual to the pair, or more gener-
ally to the group of players, by allowing each player to ask
What do we want? and What should I do to play my part in
achieving this? Team-reasoning players first search for an
outcome that would be best for the pair or group of players;
if such an outcome exists and is unique, they then identify and
play their component strategies of the jointly optimal strategy
profile, and if there is no uniquely best outcome for the group,
then team reasoning may not be feasible. Within this theoret-
ical framework, standard individual reasoning is merely a spe-
cial case of team reasoning when the team has only one mem-
ber (Bacharach, 1999; Gold & Sugden, 2007a, b).
The change of agency is both subtle and radical; it involves
a concept of group agency in which rationality is transferred
from individual players’ actions to the joint action of the group
of players as a whole, although the decisions are ultimately
taken by individuals. This notion is not entirely alien to psy-
chology. Bandura (2000) has pointed out that, although social
cognitive theory traditionally adopts an agentic perspective
with its fundamental belief in personal efficacy, increasing
social interdependence is creating an awareness of collective
agency and beliefs in the power to produce effects through
collective actions.
Team reasoning provides a solution to the problems of
coordination and payoff dominance as follows. In Aumann’s
Stag Hunt game (Fig. 1), a team-reasoning player notes that
the (C, C) strategy profile is uniquely optimal for the player
pair, because it offers the best possible payoff to both, and no
other strategy profile yields either player a payoff as good as
the payoff in (C, C). If both players adopt the team-reasoning
mode, then both will select and play their C strategies. It is
essentially the same in the Hi-Lo game shown in Fig. 2. The
(H, H) strategy profile is uniquely optimal for the player pair,
because it yields the best possible payoff to each player, there-
fore team-reasoning players select and play their H strategies.
Team reasoning solves any common-interest game—any
game with a single payoff-dominant outcome—in the same
way.
Theories of team reasoning have been developed in some
detail by Bacharach (1999, 2006) and Sugden (1993, 2003,
2015). Some of the ideas behind these theories can be traced
back to Gilbert (1987, 1989, 1990); Hurley (1989, 1991);
before them, Regan (1980); Gauthier (1975); and according
to some authorities, originally, Hodgson (1967). Similar or at
least closely related ideas have been suggested by Casajus
(2001); Janssen (2001, 2006); Heath, Ho, and Berger
(2006); Tuomela (2007, 2009); and Smerilli (2012).
Common knowledge of group identification
At first glance, team reasoning seems tomake sense only if the
co-player or all co-players are expected to adopt this mode of
reasoning; for example, a player appears to have no reason to
choose the C strategy in the Stag Hunt game (Fig. 1)—and the
risk of a zero payoff provides a reason not to choose it—unless
the co-player is expected to do likewise, and in the Hi-Lo
game a player has no reason to choose or not to choose H in
the absence of an expectation that the co-player will also
choose H. It is only when both players identify with the group
(in these cases, the dyad) that team reasoning seems workable.
All theories of team reasoning involve assumptions about
group identification by players, but Bacharach (1999) devel-
oped a theory of Bunreliable team interaction^ that allows the
possibility of team reasoning in strategic interactions lacking
common knowledge of group identification.
For Bacharach (1999, 2006), whether a player identifies
with a particular group depends on how that player frames
the decision problem. He defined a frame as the set of con-
cepts that a player uses to conceptualize a problem, and in
order to engage in team reasoning, a player’s frame must in-
clude the concept Bwe.^ As already mentioned, the switch
from individual to group identification has been extensively
researched by social psychologists, who have discovered var-
ious factors that tend to increase or decrease it (Brewer, 2007;
Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Brewer &
Kramer, 1986; Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988, 1990;
Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986). Bacharach suggested that
strong interdependence tends to induce or prime a Bwe^ frame
and that this is a necessary prerequisite for team reasoning.
Bacharach’s (1999) theory of reasoning in unreliable team
interactions takes account of players’ expectations of group
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identification by their co-players. According to the theory,
players who identify with the group and adopt the team-
reasoning mode also know the probability that other players
will do the same. His theory includes a parameter omega (0 ≤
ω ≤ 1), its value assumed to be common knowledge among
those players who group identify, representing the probability
that any individual player will adopt the Bwe^ frame and iden-
tify with the group. Team reasoners maximize the expected
collective payoff, taking into account the probability of group
identification by the co-player(s); otherwise, if the value ofω
is not high enough to make team reasoning yield a better
expected payoff than individual reasoning, from the perspec-
tive of the team, then team reasoning leads to the same strat-
egy choice that would arise from standard game-theoretic pay-
off maximization.
According to this theory, a player will sometimes adopt the
team-reasoning mode even without assurance that the co-
player(s) have identified with the group, that is, when ω <
1, and may thus end up receiving a worse individual payoff
than expected. There are even extreme circumstances in which
a player will adopt the team-reasoning mode despite a belief
that the co-player(s) will certainly reason individually (ω = 0).
Assuming once again that the collective payoff is the sum of
individual payoffs, a case in point is the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game shown in Fig. 3. In this game, whenever one player
cooperates and the other defects, the collective payoff to the
player pair (5) is greater than when both defect (2); therefore,
even if ω = 0, a team-reasoning player will choose C,
expecting a personal payoff of zero.
In Sugden’s (1993, 2003) theory, a player never deliberate-
ly pays a personal cost for team reasoning. For Sugden, indi-
viduals are motivated to adopt the team-reasoning mode only
by a promise of a better outcome for everyone involved in the
interaction, including themselves. It follows that, for Sugden,
the collective utility function, or later the goal of achieving
common interests (Sugden, 2015), can never make an individ-
ual player worse off, and in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, a player
will never prefer an asymmetric outcome with a poor personal
payoff to joint defection with a better personal payoff but a
worse collective payoff.
According to widely accepted definitions in social psychol-
ogy, cooperation is behavior that benefits two or more indi-
viduals including oneself, whereas altruism is behavior moti-
vated exclusively to benefit one or more other individuals, and
in evolutionary biology and economics, altruism is more ex-
plicitly paying a cost to provide a benefit to another individual
or individuals (Clavien & Chapuisat, 2013). Coordination is
clearly a form of cooperation—mutualistic cooperation, in the
terminology of Thomas et al. (2014)—because it is motivated
to benefit all individuals involved in an interaction.
Within this conceptual framework, Sugden’s (1993, 2003,
2015) approach to team reasoning is relevant to coordination,
in contradistinction to Bacharach’s (1999, 2006), which
includes a broader range of cooperative interactions, both mu-
tualistic and altruistic. In Sugden’s theory, a player never co-
operates in the Stag Hunt or Prisoner’s Dilemma game with-
out having assurance that the co-player will also cooperate.
Team reasoners pursue outcomes that are advantageous to all
team members and, as a consequence, Sugden’s team rea-
soners, in contrast to Bacharach’s, do not knowingly expose
themselves to the risk of receiving a sucker’s payoff. Sugden’s
is a theory of mutually assured team reasoning in which a
player will not risk team reasoning in the absence of assurance
that the other team members will also team reason. In mutu-
ally assured team reasoning, players engage in team reasoning
only if they have a reason or reasons to believe that the other
player(s) identify with the group, endorse the idea of mutually
assured team reasoning, and accept the idea that the goal is to
maximize the collective payoff of the group or (in later writ-
ings) to achieve the group’s common interests.
Group identification
There is an influential stream of research in social psychology,
arising from social identity theory, focusing on the closely
related phenomenon of group identification and its effects on
cooperation in social dilemmas (Brewer, 2007; Brewer &
Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Brewer & Kramer,
1986; Dawes et al., 1988, 1990; Kramer & Brewer, 1984,
1986). This research has shown that mutually beneficial group
identification can be increased substantially by the simple ex-
perimental manipulation of enhancing the salience of group
identity—for example, by telling an all-female group that the
research is designed to compare male and female behavior,
thereby making their similarity salient.
Findings such as these are obviously relevant to under-
standing how individuals switch from individual to collective
payoff maximization and team reasoning. For example,
Hindriks (2012) argues that they contradict Bacharach’s
(2006, p. 84) claim that strong interdependence is required
for team reasoning. Bacharach suggested that team reasoning
tends to occur in games that induce strong interdependence, a
condition generally associated with games in which a Nash
equilibrium is payoff dominated by a different outcome. But
Bacharach (p. 86) acknowledged that games with this strong
interdependence property do not invariably lead to team rea-
soning. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, for example, a player
is likely to identify with the group (in this case, the pair) if the




C 3, 3 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Fig. 3 Prisoner’s Dilemma game, with T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T
payoff-dominant joint cooperation (C, C) outcome appears
salient, but may prefer to revert to individual reasoning and
defect if the possibility of a double-cross by the co-player is
salient. Smerilli (2012) developed this idea further by propos-
ing an extension of the theory in which players use the
Bdouble-crossing intuition^ as a basis for adjudicating be-
tween individual and team reasoning. Furthermore, experi-
mental evidence has shown that perceived interdependence,
as produced by a threat of negative outcomes from dissimilar-
category others or a promise of positive outcomes from
similar-category others, is a stronger driver of group identifi-
cation than mere similarity or enhanced salience of group
identity (Flippen, Hornstein, Siegal, & Weitzman, 1996;
Henry, Arrow, & Carini, 1999). This is a rather different in-
terpretation of interdependence fromBacharach’s strong inter-
dependence, but the conclusion may apply also to strong in-
terdependence, and the comparison would be well worth in-
vestigating experimentally.
Although they share many ideas and research questions,
investigators based in behavioral game theory and social iden-
tity theory have rarely cited each other’s work, and their ap-
proaches are different in flavor. Nevertheless, incorporation of
team reasoning into social identity theory could provide a
deeper and more nuanced understanding of group identifica-
tion. A synergistic mutual benefit would no doubt result from
closer attention to each other’s work, or from collaborative
research, but there is little sign of any such rapprochement at
present. To borrow a powerful simile from Dummett (1994),
the two streams of research Bmay be compared with the Rhine
and the Danube, which rise quite close to one another and for a
time pursue roughly parallel courses, only to diverge in utterly
different directions and flow into different seas^ (p. 25).
The team-reasoning theories of Bacharach (1999, 2006),
Sugden (1993, 2003, 2015), and others differ in important
ways, especially as regards the interpretation of the collective
payoff function and what happens when common knowledge
of group identification is lacking (Gold, 2012). Before
discussing these issues, we first outline the implications of
team reasoning for understanding cooperation in social
dilemmas.
Team reasoning in social dilemmas
Although team reasoning was originally conceived to explain
problems of coordination, it also provides a compelling expla-
nation for a more familiar form of cooperation that occurs in
social dilemmas. Figure 3 shows the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T) with the now conven-
tional payoff values popularized by Axelrod (1984). The
game was discovered at the RAND Corporation, in
California, in 1950, and was named by Tucker (1950/2001),
after his well-known interpretation, in which two prisoners
have to decide whether or not to confess to a joint crime in
return for a lighter sentence. It models any binary-choice,
dyadic interaction in which both players benefit by
cooperating, but each is tempted to defect unilaterally to get
the best possible payoff and relegate the co-player to the worst
possible payoff. It has a unique Nash equilibrium at (D, D),
and the D strategy is strongly dominant for both players in the
sense that it yields a better payoff than C, irrespective of the
co-player’s choice: 5 rather than 3 if the co-player cooperates,
and 1 rather than zero if the co-player defects. (This is strate-
gic dominance, not to be confused with payoff dominance.)
Nevertheless, experimental studies have invariably revealed
that human decision makers frequently cooperate, even when
the game is played just once (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013;
Ledyard, 1995; Roth, 1995; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, &
Van Dijk, 2013), and multiplayer social dilemmas also elicit
frequent cooperation.
Team reasoning explains cooperation in social dilemmas
very easily and, arguably, more persuasively than any other
theory. Social dilemma researchers who are not conversant
with game theory may believe that players cooperate simply
because (C, C) yields a better payoff to each player than (D,
D), but we have spelled out why this makes no sense as an
explanation. The team reasoning explanation of cooperation is
as follows. In Fig. 3, if a team-reasoning player interprets the
collective payoff in the simplest and most intuitive way as
simply the sum of payoffs to the two players, then it becomes
obvious that the (C, C) strategy profile is uniquely optimal for
the player pair, because 3 + 3 = 6 is a larger joint payoff than in
any other outcome (we return to the issue of interpretation in
the following subsection). If both players see this and also
adopt the team-reasoning mode that we have described, then
both will play C, their component strategies in this optimal
profile.
Collective payoff function
Turning to areas of disagreement among team-reasoning re-
searchers, the first step in team reasoning is to identify an
outcome that is best for the group of players as a whole, and
this is usually taken to imply that team-reasoning players seek
to maximize a collective payoff function, but there is consid-
erable debate and disagreement about the nature and relevance
of this function.
The most intuitive interpretation of the collective payoff
function is simply the sum (or, equivalently in game theory,
the average) of the individual payoffs in each outcome of the
game. This is in line with classical interpretations of utility in
the writings of the pioneering utilitarian philosophers, building
on what Bentham (1976/1977, p. 393) called his fundamental
axiom: Bthe greatest happiness of the greatest number.^ Early
utilitarian philosophers suggested that what should be maxi-
mized is the sum of the individual utilities of everyone—this is
called total utilitarianism or totalism. It is now widely
1776 Psychon Bull Rev (2018) 25:1770–1783
accepted inmoral philosophy that total utilitarianism generates
a mere addition paradox and a repugnant conclusion (Parfit,
1984, Chapter 19). We need not go into those technical issues
here; people who are not moral philosophers generally under-
stand and accept the idea of interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity (I enjoyed the concert twice as much as Jane did; This is
going to hurt me as much as it hurts you), and the idea of
summing or averaging two or more people’s utilities seems
quite natural to some people, at least. Indeed, even von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Section 2.1.1) treated util-
ity exactly like money: Bunrestrictedly divisible and substitut-
able, freely transferable and identical, even in the quantitative
sense, with whatever ‘satisfaction’ or ‘utility’ is desired by
each participant^ (p. 8), although they of all people knew that
utilities are not really additive between people, because it was
they who introduced the modern, formal theory of expected
utility, with full axiomatic development in an appendix to the
second edition of their book in 1947. According to the theory,
a person’s utility is measured on an interval scale with an
arbitrary zero point and unit of measurement for each
individual.2
Bacharach’s (1999) theory incorporates expected utility
theory explicitly, but he acknowledged that the collective pay-
off function could be entirely different from the utilitarian
function (Bacharach, 2006, p. 88). He believed the nature of
the function to be an empirical question but that it must be
Paretian in the sense that, if every individual receives as much
utility in Outcome x as in Outcome y, and at least one individ-
ual receives more, then the collective payoff function must
rank x above y. However, the Pareto criterion on its own does
not fully specify a collective payoff function. It does not rank
outcomes where the players’ interests must be traded off
against each other. For example, it provides no ranking of
the outcomes off the main diagonal in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (Fig. 3) relative to the (C, C) outcome. In
theory, a collective utility function could even allow the sac-
rifice of one player if it benefits the rest of the group.With this
idea in mind, Bacharach (2006, p. 91, footnote 4) suggested
that group identification could explain the existence of suicide
bombers who are willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause.
Sugden (1993, 2003) rejected the idea of a collective pay-
off function as simply the sum or average of the individual
payoffs in each outcome and, in later work, he rejected the
relevance of a collective payoff function entirely, writing that
Bteam members aim to achieve their common interests, not to
maximise a common utility function^ (Sugden, 2015, p. 156).
In particular, Sugden assumed that individuals are motivated
to engage in team reasoning only by the promise of better
payoffs for themselves and other group members. In
Sugden’s theory, players aim only to achieve team outcomes
that give them more than their benchmark maximin payoffs—
the highest payoffs that they can guarantee for themselves
independently of the co-players’ strategy choices. This has
the flavor of a bargaining or social contract theory. Indeed,
Sugden (2015) mentioned Hobbes (1951/1961), comparing
an individual’s maximin payoff to what that individual could
get in a Hobbesian state of nature. A collective payoff function
that simply maximizes the sum of the individual payoffs takes
no account of whether some players reduce their individual
payoffs by team reasoning, and therefore maximizing the sum
of individual payoffs cannot function as amethod of achieving
common interests in Sugden’s theory (Gold, 2017).
Social value orientations
The psychological concept of social value orientation was
introduced by Messick and McClintock (1968) and
McClintock (1972) in recognition of the fact that several dif-
ferent social motives are possible in two-player social di-
lemmas: players may prefer to maximize their own individual
payoffs (individualistic SVO), the collective payoffs of the
player pair (cooperative SVO), the difference between own
and co-player’s payoffs (competitive SVO), or the co-player’s
payoffs (altruistic SVO). The default assumption in orthodox
game theory, incorporated in the first assumption mentioned
in the section on Game Theory, above, is that all players at all
times are motivated by the individualistic SVO. However,
reviews by Bogaert, Boone, and Declerck (2008) and
Rusbult and Van Lange (2003) confirm the existence of much
experimental evidence that people vary greatly in their pre-
dominant social motivations and the fact that SVO explains
much of the variance in players’ choices in social dilemmas; in
particular, people with the cooperative SVOmake significant-
ly more cooperative choices and expect more cooperation
from their co-players than players with individualistic or com-
petitive SVO. Merely noticing that the collective payoff is
highest in (C, C) cannot, on its own, explain cooperation, for
the same reason that it cannot explain a Hi choice in the Hi-Lo
game discussed earlier, but the cooperative social value orien-
tation (SVO) is nevertheless clearly relevant to the payoff
dominance and coordination.
Most recent researchers have interpreted SVO as a trait or
individual difference variable, measurable by questionnaires,
that correlates significantly with personality descriptions giv-
en by friends and associates and predicts activities such as
volunteering for charitable causes (Rusbult & Van Lange,
2003). However, Messick and McClintock (1968) originally
conceived of SVO as an experimentally manipulable state
variable—in their own experiment, they manipulated it by
2 Familiar interval scales are the Fahrenheit and Celsius scales of temperature.
Suppose someone in New York, where Fahrenheit is commonly used, e-mails
a relative in London, where the standard is Celsius, and says, BIt’s quite warm
here today: It’s 70 degrees,^ and the relative replies, BWe’re having a
heatwave: It’s 30 degrees.^ It would make no sense to say that the total tem-
perature is 100 degrees, or that the average of the two temperatures is 50
degrees.
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describing the co-player either as an Bopponent^ (to induce a
competitive SVO) or a Bpartner^ (to induce a cooperative
SVO), and by displaying the players’ accumulated scores in
different ways to draw attention to their own payoffs, joint
payoffs, or relative payoffs. This suggests a feasible program
of experimental research that could be designed to investigate
SVO in relation to team reasoning. It seems likely that the
stimulus conditions that tend to prime cooperative SVO in
social dilemmas are also likely to prime team reasoning in
coordination games. Incorporation of theoretical ideas and
experimental findings from team reasoning would obviously
strengthen and deepen SVO theory because the current theory
cannot explain how or why cooperative SVO results in coop-
erative strategy choices in social dilemmas.
Experimental evidence for team reasoning
Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994) reported the results of an
experiment demonstrating that players in pure coordination
games draw on shared concepts of salience to identify focal
points that enable them to coordinate, but they did not discuss
team reasoning as a mode of strategy selection in such games.
The first published experiment explicitly designed to test team
reasoning was reported by Colman, Pulford, and Rose
(2008a), who presented subjects with five 3 × 3 common-
interest games, each of which had a unique Nash equilibrium
and a different outcome that was payoff dominant over all
other outcomes, including the Nash equilibrium. In all five
games, a majority of players chose strategies aligned with
the payoff-dominant, collectively rational outcome in prefer-
ence to individually rational strategies mandated by the Nash
equilibria. This showed that, in these games, team reasoning
predicted strategy choices more successfully than orthodox
game theory did. Although these results are consistent with
theories of team reasoning, they do not rule out other theories
that explain the payoff-dominance phenomenon in different
ways. Bardsley et al. (2010) reported two experiments specif-
ically designed to distinguish between team reasoning and
cognitive hierarchy theory (the main ideas of which are
outlined in the section that follows). One of their experiments
provided strong support for team reasoning, but the other sup-
ported cognitive hierarchy theory. Bardsley and Ule (2017)
tested team reasoning experimentally against a theory accord-
ing to which players choose best replies to co-players who
choose randomly (a form of cognitive hierarchy theory), and
the results were generally consistent with team reasoning.
Butler (2012) reported the results of two experiments de-
signed to test Bacharach’s (1999, 2006) team-reasoning theo-
ry in particular. In the first experiment, he used 25 miscella-
neous 2 × 2 games, including Stag Hunt, Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Chicken, and Tender Trap games; and in the second, 20
Prisoner ’s Dilemma games and 20 Chicken games.
Although the results of both experiments were consistent with
team reasoning, they did not support Bacharach’s mathemat-
ical model, according to which the proportion of team-
reasoning strategy choices should be predicted by the value
of the parameterω, calculated by Butler for each game using
an assumption of interpersonally additive payoffs.
Colman et al. (2014) reported the results of two experi-
ments designed to test cognitive hierarchy theory, team rea-
soning, and strong Stackelberg reasoning, all of which provide
putative explanations of coordination and are outlined in the
subsection that follows, against one another. To get around the
problem that these theories make identical predictions in
common-interest games such as the Stag Hunt and Hi-Lo
games, they used 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 experimental games, most
of them asymmetric, all lacking payoff-dominant solutions,
and each designed in such a way that the theories being tested
make different predictions about the strategies that the players
would choose. The two experiments yielded highly consistent
results suggesting that cognitive hierarchy Level-1 reasoning,
strong Stackelberg reasoning, and team reasoning each played
a part in explaining strategy choices. Cognitive hierarchy
Level-1 reasoning was most successful at predicting strategy
choices, especially in 4 × 4 games, but strong Stackelberg
reasoning was also successful in 3 × 3 games, and team rea-
soning, which imposes less of a cognitive burden on players
than the other hypothesized reasoning processes, was success-
ful in both 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 games.
Pulford, Colman, Lawrence, and Krockow (2017) tested
six competing theories that can potentially explain coopera-
tion in the Centipede game, a dynamic two-player game in-
volving alternating cooperative or defecting choices. These
researchers used four versions of the Centipede game with
different payoff structures, plus a static (normal-form) version.
The games were specially designed to test the theories against
one another, each theory predicting a different pattern of be-
havior in the different versions of the game. The results deci-
sively refuted four of the six theories that were tested. Only
two theories, team reasoning and fuzzy-trace theory, success-
fully explained strategy choices across the different versions
of this game.
Other explanations of coordination
As indicated earlier, theories of team reasoning are not the
only explanations of coordination. For the sake of complete-
ness, we sketch briefly in this section the principal alterna-
tives, and we explain the fundamental ideas behind them in
relation to the simplest Hi-Lo game shown in Fig. 2. What
distinguishes team reasoning frommost of the other theories is
that it is a theory of rational choice, whereas the others, with
the arguable exception of strong Stackelberg reasoning, are
psychological explanations of nonrational behavior.
According to social projection theory (Acevedo &
Krueger, 2005; Krueger, 2007; Krueger, DiDonato, &
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Freestone, 2012), most people expect others to behave as they
do, and they therefore assume that, if they choose H (Fig. 2),
then the co-player is also likely to choose H. It follows that a
player expects to receive a payoff of 2 by choosing H and 1 by
choosing L, and this provides a reason for choosing H. Al-
Nowaihi and Dhami (2015) have recently developed a formal
version of this theory. Social projection theory provides a
psychological but not necessarily a rational mechanism for
H choice. It is related to what economists and philosophers
call evidential reasoning or magical thinking, which is gener-
ally regarded as irrational (Elster, 1989; Joyce, 1999; Lewis,
1981; Quattrone & Tversky, 1984).
Cognitive hierarchy and Level-k theories (Camerer, Ho, &
Chong, 2004; Stahl & Wilson, 1994, 1995) are designed to
model players who reason with varying levels of strategic
depth. Level-0 players have no beliefs about their co-players
and choose strategies either randomly, with uniform probabil-
ity, or by using simple heuristics such as salience; Level-1
players maximize their own payoffs relative to a belief that
their co-players are Level-0 players; Level-2 players maxi-
mize their own payoffs relative to a belief that their co-
players are Level-1 players; and so on. Experiments have con-
firmed the findings of Camerer et al. that Level 1 is most
common, followed by Level 2 (Bardsley et al., 2010;
Colman et al., 2014). In the Hi-Lo game, a Level-1 player
who assumes that the co-player is choosing between H and
L randomly, with equal probability, chooses H, because that
yields an expected payoff of 1, whereas choosing L yields
½—the same calculation as under the principle of indiffer-
ence, mentioned earlier, but with a different idea behind it.
Level-2 players choose H because they expect their co-
players to choose H with certainty, and the same applies at
higher levels.
Strong Stackelberg reasoning (Colman & Bacharach,
1997; Colman et al., 2014; Colman & Stirk, 1998; Pulford
et al., 2014; Pulford et al., 2017) entails an assumption that
players choose strategies as though their co-players could an-
ticipate their choices. Thus, a Stackelberg reasoner chooses as
though expecting a choice of H to be anticipated by the co-
player, who would therefore choose H because it is the best
reply, and an L choice to be met with an L choice by the co-
player for the same reason. The Stackelberg reasoner gets a
better payoff in the first case than the second and therefore
chooses H. There is no necessary assumption that people who
use strong Stackelberg reasoning actually believe that others
can anticipate their choices, merely that they act as though this
were the case. Strong Stackelberg reasoning is a
straightforward generalization of a form of reasoning
suggested by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944,
Sections 14.2 and 14.3) to explain rational strategy choices
in strictly competitive games. It involves no magical thinking:
players act as though their co-players could read their minds,
without actually believing that they can, merely as a heuristic
device to clarify the logic of the game. The reasoning de-
scribed by von Neumann and Morgenstern is a special case
of strong Stackelberg reasoning for strictly competitive
games.
The theory of virtual bargaining (Misyak & Chater, 2014;
Misyak, Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & Chater, 2014) proposes that
individuals reason about problems of coordination by consid-
ering what strategies theywould agree on if they could bargain
or negotiate explicitly. In the Hi-Lo game and arguably also in
the Stag Hunt game, it is obvious what bargain they would
arrive at, hence communication is unnecessary and they
choose the appropriate H or C strategies directly.
Where to from here? Interdisciplinary
cross-fertilization
Team reasoning offers a persuasive solution to the ubiquitous
problem of coordination in social interaction, and a growing
body of experimental evidence reviewed in an earlier section
suggests that it does indeed occur. The other prominent theo-
ries that we have outlined and discussed can also explain the
phenomenon in principle, and there is evidence suggesting
that they may also contribute to a full explanation, but team
reasoning appears to have the strongest support across exper-
iments. A full understanding of team reasoning requires fur-
ther theoretical development and detailed experimental inves-
tigation of the stimulus conditions that prime it, and that is
where psychologists could play a major role. The literature
that we have reviewed suggests exciting possibilities for inter-
disciplinary integration that would help to advance both psy-
chology (cognitive and social) and behavioral game theory.
Social psychologists working on group identification need
to engage with the work of behavioral game theorists working
on team reasoning, and vice versa. Psychologists Brewer and
Chen (2007), in an excellent and otherwise comprehensive
review of individualism and collectivism, did not even men-
tion team reasoning, and it is quite rare for articles on team
reasoning to make more than a passing reference to the
burgeoning social psychological literature on group identifi-
cation. It seems obvious that the two research traditions have a
lot to learn from each other. If the manipulations reported by
social psychologists as triggers of group identification
(Brewer, 2007; Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner,
1996; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Dawes et al., 1988, 1990;
Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986) have the same effect on team
reasoning in games affording opportunities for coordination,
then they will help to explain team reasoning directly, and the
claim by Hindriks (2012) that strong interdependence is not a
prerequisite for team reasoning will be vindicated. On the
other hand, if strong interdependence can be shown experi-
mentally to prime group identification, as hypothesized by
Bacharach (2006, p. 84), then that would be an important
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addition, hitherto entirely neglected, to the social psycholog-
ical theory of group identification. Incorporation of team rea-
soning into social identity theory could thus lead to a deeper
understanding of group identification.
The other major opportunity for integration that emerges
from our review relates to social value orientation (SVO), and
the possibility of returning to the historical origins of this
concept (McClintock, 1972; Messick & McClintock, 1968),
when it was conceived primarily as a state variable, dependent
on stimulus conditions, rather than a stable trait variable.
Theories of team reasoning provide important insights into
the stimulus conditions that lead to decision makers becoming
motivated to maximize collective rather than individual pay-
offs. An SVO that is one of the most commonly observed is
the cooperative SVO, according to which individuals are mo-
tivated to maximize the joint or collective payoff of the pair or
group of players. An obvious lacuna in this theory, at least
insofar as it purports to explain cooperation in social di-
lemmas, is that the cooperative motivation on its own does
not amount to team reasoning, although it is a necessary step
in the process of team reasoning. It therefore cannot explain
cooperation fully, and incorporation of team reasoning into the
theory of the cooperative SVO would obviously strengthen
this theory significantly. In the Hi-Lo game, the payoff trans-
formations associated with the cooperative or prosocial SVO
merely results in another Hi-Lo game with larger payoffs
(Colman, Pulford, & Rose, 2008b). Furthermore, any experi-
mental findings on the stimulus conditions that prime the co-
operative SVO, including those reported by Messick and
McClintock all those years ago, are potentially relevant to
our understanding of team reasoning and should be incorpo-
rated into behavioral game theory.
Concluding comments
Do people engage in team reasoning? It is difficult to argue
that they do not, because they often say things that seem to
imply that they do. People often claim to be performing some
action Bin the interests of the university,^ Bfor the good of the
department,^ or Bbecause it’s best for the family,^ implying
that they are pursuing group goals rather than individual self-
interests, and there is no obvious reason to doubt that they
mean what they say. Everyday experience suggests that it is
not uncommon for people to set aside their individual self-
interests and to act in what they judge to be best interests of
groups to which they belong, including the religious, ethnic,
and national groups that form part of their social identities.
Although team reasoning is not the only explanation for such
apparent manifestations of collective rationality, the experi-
mental evidence suggests that team reasoning is at least one
of the processes underlying them.
If team reasoning is indeed a common mode of choosing
strategies in strategic interactions, then what is the nature of
the collective payoff function that is implicitly being maxi-
mized when people adopt this mode of reasoning, if indeed
that is what is happening? This is an open question, and there
are sharp differences of opinion regarding the nature of this
presumed function. At one extreme is the possibility that in-
dividuals maximize the objective payoffs of their co-players
without any consideration of their own. This purely altruistic
type of collective payoff function has been investigated theo-
retically, with interesting and unexpected results (Colman,
Körner, Musy, & Tazdaït, 2011). At the other extreme is
Sugden’s (1993, 2003, 2015) mutualistic assumption that in-
dividuals are motivated to engage in team reasoning only
when they believe that they and all other group members will
do likewise and that all will benefit from the resulting out-
come. Concepts such as game harmony (Tan & Zizzo,
2008), indexed by product-moment correlation between the
players’ payoffs in a two-player game, may help to explain
when this is likely to occur. The nature of the collective payoff
function is perhaps an empirical question that could be re-
solved by future experimental research.
Does team reasoning occur only when all members of a
group feel sure that the others will also adopt the same ap-
proach? The theory developed by Bacharach (1999, 2006)
does not restrict team reasoning to such situations of mutual
assurance, but Sugden’s (1993, 2003, 2015) theory does: For
Sugden, the motive for team reasoning is to achieve a better
outcome for everyone, and players do not adopt this mode of
reasoning without mutual assurance. This difference of opin-
ion is difficult to resolve on purely theoretical grounds, al-
though it is worth noting that Bacharach’s theory implies a
more general conception of collective rationality and can, in
principle at least, explain a wider range of instances of team
reasoning. This difference may be an empirical question, or it
may suggest the existence of different forms of team
reasoning.
Team reasoning is a hard sell, especially in the United
States and other fervently individualistic cultures. Cognitive
and social psychology traditionally assumes an agentic view,
according to which individuals are producers of experience
and shapers of events, and human agency is conceived largely
in terms of personal efficacy exercised individually (Bandura,
2000). But many human goals, from scheduling meetings and
carrying large objects to agreeing international standards and
coordinating military operations in theatres of war, are simply
unattainable without coordination.
This article has drawn attention to exciting opportunities
that appear to exist for incorporating team reasoning into so-
cial identity theory and also into the theory of cooperative
social value orientation (SVO). Both theories could be signif-
icantly strengthened by such interdisciplinary cross-
fertilization; furthermore, behavioral game theory could
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certainly benefit by incorporating some aspects of SVO theo-
ry, rather than assuming that decision makers are individual-
istically motivated in all circumstances. We agree with
Thomas et al. (2014), who have argued that coordination or
Bmutualistic cooperation^ deserves far more research atten-
tion than it has hitherto received:
Much has been learned about these domains of psychol-
ogy from a focus on the problem of altruistic coopera-
tion and the mechanisms of reciprocity. We hope that
comparable insights are waiting to be discovered by
psychologists as they investigate the problem of mutu-
alistic cooperation. (p. 673)
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